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Migration, Crises and Social Transformation in India Since the 1990s 
Abstract 
Since liberalization, urban migration in India has increased in quantity, but also changed 
in quality, with permanent marriage migration and temporary, circular employment 
migration rising, even as permanent economic migration remains stagnant. We 
understand internal migration in India to be a re-ordering of productive and reproductive 
labor that signifies a deep transformation of society. We argue that this transformation is 
a response to three overlapping crises: an agrarian crisis, an employment crisis, and a 
crisis of social reproduction. These are not crises for capitalist accumulation, which they 
enable. Rather, they make it impossible for a majority of Indians to achieve stable, rooted 
livelihoods.  
Keywords: Migration, India, Urbanization, Social Reproduction 
I. Introduction 
This paper looks at the close tension/relationship in India between recent social 
transformations and migration crises1. We look at two specific transformations - 
accelerated urbanization, and deeper penetration of a neo-liberal kind of capitalism over 
the last 2-3 decades in rural and urban India. The current Indian urbanization, along with 
Chinese urbanization since 1980s, should be seen as a globe-transforming phenomenon, 
as about a tenth of the world's population are changing their status from rural to urban, 
primarily through internal migration (but also through extended urbanization). 
Simultaneously, these economies have increasingly come under the logic of neo-liberal 
capitalism, greatly increasing the spread of capitalism over the past 3-4 decades. In this 
paper, we argue that internal migration in India is mainly a re-ordering of productive and 
reproductive labor that signifies a deep transformation of society. It is accentuated by 
three overlapping crises (in practice) that we present below.  
The first two of these three crises are widely acknowledged: an agrarian crisis 
marked by low agricultural growth rates, a livelihoods crisis for small farmers, and 
reduced wage employment in agriculture; and an employment crisis where non-
agricultural employment (in urban and rural areas) is inadequate in quantity and quality 
to compensate for the decline in agricultural employment. The first crisis pushes large 
numbers of rural residents to seek employment outside of agriculture, which means 
moving to urban areas for jobs in construction and low skill services. The second 
(employment) crisis accentuates the phenomenon of urban precarity/informality, and 
makes migration transient, with migrants returning to rural homes once a particular spell 
of employment is completed, only to start a new journey later. The migration process in 
India thus challenges boundaries of urban/rural and raises the question of what this 
phenomenon of increased migration signifies, something that we explore in the 
subsequent sections. 
The third overlapping crisis that shapes migration patterns is a social reproduction 
crisis in which a lack of social provisioning by the state, and declining access to the rural 
and urban commons have expanded rather than compressed the temporal and spatial 
disconnect between productive and reproductive work, making it more difficult for 
workers to bridge this divide. This background of social reproductive crisis helps explain 
why family migration is relatively common in India. Although there are significant 
streams of single, male migration, particularly in North-Central India, many temporary 
migrants move as couples, often with their children. This may be due to relatively rigid 
gender divisions of labor when it comes to productive labor in industries such as 
construction. However, studies of urban labor also point out the impossibility of ensuring 
basic biological reproduction on very low wages without substantial reliance upon unpaid 
labor, whether it is to generate food, access unreliable and distant sources of water, or to 
ensure that children are clothed and fed. 
1 The crises we discuss here are those that induce migration and challenge the ability of Indian households 
to ensure stable, rooted, social reproduction. We do not use the term ‘migration crises’ to imply that 
migration itself is a crisis, nor do we think that what we are witnessing is a crisis for capitalist accumulation 
itself. 
 
 In presenting these overlapping crises we are talking about patterns that go back 
at least two decades now. The term crisis suggests something that is contained in time 
and space (and can alternate with moments and places of non-crisis), and neither of these 
appears to be the case in India today. These are also not crises that are bringing the 
system to a halt, or even causing political or economic upheaval. Instead, each of these 
elements appears to be accepted as part of the social fabric, to be worked around and 
within, to be normal in fact. We thus wish to theorize the new normal of Indian 
development as something that is defined by a state of continuous movement of labor 
(both of the productive and reproductive kinds) across the rural and urban divide, that is 
precarious and informal in nature, and that allows for capital to more easily extract 
surplus.  
 
In this sense, the three inter-related crises are not crises for capital (they actually 
facilitate easier accumulation), but are crises for a sustained and rooted reproduction of 
the majority of working people. These crises transform themselves into transient 
movement/migration (not a paralysis of labor), with an ameliorating role (with respect to 
the crises) played by gender relations that ensure that reproductive labor absorbs the 
uncertainty and precarity of this movement. Therefore, migration can be understood as 
the transformation of the overall division of social labor, resulting from the three 
overlapping crises presented above. 
 
II. Migration to Urban India 
 
The literature analyzes migration to urban India across two main temporal-spatial 
axes: permanent versus temporary, and rural-urban versus urban-urban, to which we add 
inter-state versus intra-state. The absence of reliable national level data on temporary 
migration means that the analyses of temporary migration are often qualitative rather than 
quantitative, with the reverse being true for permanent migration. Despite the data 
limitations however, two important trends emerge from these studies. First, migration to 
urban India has increased in quantity over the last two decades. Second, this increase is 
driven by both temporary, circular employment migration of the ‘footloose’ kind 
(Breman 2010) as well as permanent marriage migration, even as permanent economic 
migration remains stagnant.  We argue that it is not a coincidence that these changes have 
occurred at the same time as the intensification of the three kinds of crises discussed in 
this paper. These crises have transformed the way that the majority of Indians earn a 
livelihood, forcing them to seek work wherever they can find it, including in the city. The 
burden of these crises is borne in gendered way, however, requiring an intensification of 
women’s work, without which even this extremely precarious means of existence would 
not be viable. 
 
 
a. Permanent versus Temporary 
 
(i) Permanent migration 
 
Permanent migration in India is defined by the decennial Indian Census, as well 
as the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) as a move to a new ‘usual place of 
residence’ for a year or more. According to the Census, the share of Indians engaged in 
permanent migration has been relatively stagnant, with about 30% of the population 
reporting themselves as permanent migrants over the last several decades. The NSS data 
indicates an increase from 23% to 28% between 1983 and 2007-08 (Table 1). While both 
the Census and the NSS provide us with data on migration, due to the greater degree of 
detail in the NSS, we focus on the latter. 
 
According to the NSS data, the share of urban migrants within all permanent 
migrants has risen slightly after 1988, indicating an urbanization of permanent migration. 
The increase in the overall share of permanent migrants is, however, driven by the 
migration of women who move to their marital homes after marriage. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The NSS divides permanent migrants into migrants for “economic” reasons, 
migrants for studies, “follower” migrants (who accompany a primary earner) and 
marriage migrants. Amongst working age male migrants, the first category is the largest, 
but relatively unchanged. Amongst working age women, on the other hand, while the first 
and second categories are falling, the share of marriage migrants has grown. Between 
1983 and 2008, marriage migration increased across most parts of India (Mazumdar et al 
2013, Rao and Finnoff 2015). In almost every state in the northern, central, eastern and 
western regions, 60% or more of working age women reported being marriage migrants 
in 2008, with the highest concentration of marriage migrants in the relatively poor ‘Hindi 
heartland’ states. Thus female marriage migrants constitute the largest and fastest 
growing group of permanent migrants in India (Tables 1 and 2). Due to the ubiquity of 
patri-local marriage for women, Indian girls are effectively raised as migrants in the 
making, constantly reminded that their home will eventually be elsewhere.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The profile of male, mostly economic, permanent migrants and that of female, mostly 
marriage migrants, differs in one important way. Permanent male urban migrants tend to 
have higher levels of education and skill, and tend to experience upward mobility in the 
destination area, with urban-urban migrants being the best off. Thus male permanent 
migration tends to accentuate rural-urban inequality through a “brain drain” of sorts 
(Vakulabharanam and Thakurata 2014). Not surprisingly, female follower migrants share 
the relatively better off socio-economic profile of male permanent economic migrants 
(Rao 2017). However, female urban marriage migrants have education levels below the 
average for urban non-migrant women, and most rural-urban marriage migrants appear to 
enter the households of relatively poor urban men. Rao and Finnoff (2015) see this as a 
result of rising rural-urban inequality in combination with the employment crisis.  They 
argue that even poorer urban households become desirable as marriage alliances for rural 
households, since the jobs crisis in urban India makes the marriage market a more 
feasible way to gain an urban foothold than the labor market. It is unclear whether the 
women thus married into the urban precariat are left better off, but control over the bodies 
of women thus becomes one way that rural families are able to access an exclusionary 
urban economy. 
 
(ii) Temporary migration 
 
The data on temporary and circular migrants is a great deal less reliable. Neither 
the Census nor the NSS able to capture these forms of migration with much accuracy, 
although the 2007-08 NSS survey does make a more serious attempt to do so. The NSS 
defines migration for durations of more than one month but less than 6 months as 
‘temporary’. As Table 3 shows, by this definition in 2007-08 almost 14 million Indians 
were engaged in temporary migration, double the number in 1999-00. However, this data 
also indicates a decrease in temporary migration to urban areas in this period 
(Vakulabharanam and Thakurata 2014). There is almost universal agreement that this is 
an underestimation. As squatters and pavement dwellers, temporary urban migrants do 
not have a fixed residence in urban areas and are therefore not captured by the Census or 
NSS surveyors (Roy 2007, Breman 2010). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Field studies from across the country (DeHaan 2002, Rogaly and Rafique 2003, 
Shah 2006, Mosse et al 2002, Guérin et al. 2007, Roy 2007, Garikipati 2008, Breman 
2010, Pattenden 2016, Picherit 2016) show that temporary migration has become an 
integral part of the livelihood portfolio for most rural Indians. There is evidence from this 
literature that the scale of such temporary migration increased in the 2000s partly as a 
consequence of the agrarian crisis that began in the 1990s. Deshingkar and Start (2003) 
estimate that there might be up to 100 million temporary migrants in India today.  
 
These field studies, as well as an analysis of the NSS data on temporary migration 
(Keshri and Bhagat 2012) show that temporary migration is a strategy pursued by those 
who are relatively poor, have little or no land, are low-skilled/semi-skilled, and lower 
caste.  Temporary migrants also rely upon (and are drawn into relations of debt 
dependence upon) labor contractors and brokers in ways that permanent migrants are less 
likely to. The least well off of these migrants tend to move with at least some members of 
their families, so that the share of women temporary migrants, while hard to pin down 
exactly, does seem to be higher than the NSS estimate (Virk 2004, Lahiri-Dutt 2008, 
Pattenden 2012, Guérin et al 2015). However, not all of these women may perform paid 
work in the urban destination, for reasons discussed later.  
 
Many of these migrants work in seasonal industries such as construction, the brick 
making industry, small and artisan mining, and assorted low skill services in urban areas 
(Agnihotri and Mazumdar 2009, Lahiri-Dutt 2008). Due to the sex-segregated nature of 
labor in both construction and brick making work in India, workers are hired as ‘jodi’s or 
couples, encouraging the migration of families, and providing employment to some low 
skill migrant women as well as men. For women, an additional important source of 
employment is domestic work in urban households, which has expanded with the 
increase in the number of urban professional workers and double-earner households 
(Mazumdar et al 2013). Domestic workers labor alone, doing work that is highly 
stigmatized, in the “private” space of a home. They are therefore routinely subjected to 
economic exploitation, sexual abuse, and various kinds of social humiliation, but have 
little ability to protect themselves against such abuse or to seek recourse when abuse 
occurs (Coelho et al 2013). For both men and women who migrate, therefore, the 
employment opportunities that are available are ‘indecent’ along multiple axes.  
 
What we know about the lives of urban migrants suggests that the term 
‘temporary’ migration is misleading in two ways.  The primary sources on this kind of 
migration show that while some temporary migrants do indeed move for less than a year, 
others do so for several years at a time, but to spaces that escape official efforts to 
enumerate them. Furthermore, as Breman (2010) famously argued in proposing the term 
‘footloose labor’, temporary migrants engage in multiple moves across a migrant’s 
lifetime, not always to the same destination. They eventually return to homesteads in 
rural areas, in part because exclusionary urban development denies them the possibility 
of an urban space of their own.  A particular migratory trip may thus be bounded by time, 
but migration is a much more permanent condition of existence for such migrants than for 
‘permanent’, one-time migrants.  
 
 
b. Spatial categories 
 
(i) Rural-urban and Urban-urban migration 
 
The NSS data on urban permanent migrants summarized in Table 2 suggests that 
amongst both men and women, rural-urban migration is the larger stream (rural-rural 
remains the largest, but is not the subject of this paper) and, amongst male migrants, 
growing faster than urban-urban migration. As mentioned above, urban-urban migrants 
amongst both women and men also appear to be significantly better off than non-
migrants both before and after migration (Vakulabharanam and Thakurata 2014).  
 
Amongst temporary migrants as well, rural-urban may be the larger category and 
growing faster than urban-urban migration, contributing to the process of urbanization 
discussed below. However, empirical reality may have overtaken traditional 
classifications, with many temporary migrants being footloose labor: moving sometime 
from village to city, at others from one city to another, and at yet other times from one 
village to another (Breman 2010).  While there are well established migratory paths in 
some parts of the country (Bihar to Delhi and Punjab, Mahbubnagar to Mumbai and 
Hyderabad), new ones appear to be rapidly emerging, and as we suggested earlier, rigid 
divisions between rural and urban destinations may no longer be as useful to understand 
this world of insecurity and impermanence.  
 
(ii) Inter-state versus intra-state 
 
Substantial inequalities between Indian states have developed over time, with 
Indian states in the center and east falling behind others in the west, south and northwest. 
One question is thus whether inter-state migration has played a role in reducing or 
increasing these inequalities. As far as permanent migration goes, almost 85% of 
marriage migration is still intra-state as a result of cultural and linguistic commonalities. 
Inter-state migration accounted for 41% of all permanent economic migration in 2008, 
according to the NSS (Table 4). However, an early study by Cashin and Sahay(1996) 
argued that at least until 1990s, inter-state economic migration was unable to create 
convergence between regions. Although Table 4 shows an increase in the share of inter-
state migration within the overall stagnant shares of permanent economic migration over 
the 2000s, the small numbers of relatively privileged migrants involved suggests that this 
stream is inequality reinforcing rather than inequality reducing (Vakulabharanam and 
Motiram 2016).  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 With temporary migration, in the absence of data we must once again rely upon 
micro studies. These do seem to suggest the expansion of inter-state migration routes. 
The growth of the southern cities of Bengaluru and Hyderabad mean that workers from 
Odisha, Bihar and the Northeast are now finding their way southward. The most 
documented streams of temporary migration are from relatively poor states such as Bihar, 
UP, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha to Delhi and the other metropolitan cities, for 
construction and brick kiln work. There is also evidence of temporary migration from and 
within states like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, which have much higher living standards on 
average, but also have relatively high levels of inequality. Deshingkar et al (2008) trace 
the increasing rates of migration amongst villages in Madhya Pradesh, with villagers 
travelling to new destinations in Gujarat and Delhi. In this case the authors do see 
increases in “accumulative” migration than improves the economic conditions of 
migrants, thus possibly reducing inequality between origin and destination (see also 
Rodgers and Rodgers 2011). But this study is countered by several others that conclude 
that temporary migration remains distress migration that results in little long term 
improvement in living conditions (Mosse et al 2005, Roy 2007, Breman 2010). Most 
studies indicate that even when temporary migrants do bring back some savings are 
unable to invest them in assets in rural areas, usually spending them on health needs or 
the repayment of debt (Pattenden 2012). However, migration to urban areas may still 
enable challenges to caste-based hierarchies of power in the home village, even as it 
makes workers more vulnerable to capitalist exploitation (Guerin et al 2007, Picherit 
2016). 
 
The second interesting aspect of inter-state migration is the degree to which 
language, clothing, caste-composition and cultural norms vary between Indian states. One 
implication of this has been mentioned earlier - marriage migration remains mostly intra-
state. The second implication is that inter-state migration is a risk-laden and potentially 
alienating experience in India in a way that is more than just a function of the greater 
distance travelled. Making the connections that lead to jobs, or housing, or a rich 
community life is much more complicated when language, clothes and food change. 
Migrants from out of state are often cast as ‘outsiders’ in periodic political mobilizations 
that target their real or perceived economic gains as at the expense of ‘insiders’.  Inter-
state migration may thus create pools of migrant labor even easier to monitor and 
discipline.  
 
 
III. The Three Overlapping Crises and Migration 
 
a. Agrarian Crisis 
 
 Starting in the mid-1990s, Indian society/economy has witnessed an agrarian 
crisis that has spread unevenly across the country. One startling manifestation of this 
crisis is that more than 300,000 farmers have committed suicide, according to official 
estimates from National Crime Records Bureau in India (Sainath 2015). This suicide 
phenomenon started in the mid-1990s, when India embarked on a drive to liberalize its 
agriculture. Liberalization, in the Indian context, meant connecting the Indian agriculture 
to the larger world economy, as well as dismantling multiple support structures that 
Indian farmers had won from the Indian state through their movements. We describe the 
main features of this crisis below. 
 
 While the agrarian crisis in India coincides with the introduction of market-
oriented reforms in agriculture, the reforms are not solely responsible for the crisis, 
although they constitute the most important causal factor (Vakulabharanam and Motiram 
2011). The soil and groundwater-eroding effects of the Green Revolution experiment of 
the 1960s have been critically important to the slowdown of productivity improvements 
too across the country by the 1990s. While Green Revolution had been introduced in a 
few pockets of grain production in the late 1960s in India, its technologies spread to other 
parts of the country and to the cultivation of non-grain crops (a phenomenon termed as a 
'Lagged Green Revolution') by the 1980s (Vakulabharanam 2004). In the last decade or 
so, there have been three additional explanations for the increasing agrarian distress. 
First, through processes of 'accumulation by dispossession' the advancing urban spaces as 
well as industry (through the creation of special economic zones) have begun to displace 
large numbers of farmers from their farmlands and livelihoods (Jenkins et. al. 2014). 
Second, it has been suggested in recent research that climate change may be closely 
linked to the distress and the suicide phenomenon (Carleton 2017). Third, there has also 
been an increase in the presence of corporate capital through arrangements like contract 
farming and corporate farming (Motiram and Vakulabharanam 2007). All these different 
factors have converged in creating and deepening a widespread and spatially uneven 
distress phenomenon in Indian agriculture (slowing agricultural growth rates is one of 
many manifestations of this). 
 
 Many researchers have identified agricultural liberalization as the main 
contributing cause for the agrarian crisis (for an edited volume that covers multiple 
aspects of the crisis, see Reddy and Mishra 2009). Especially in the period, 1995-2006, 
integrating Indian agriculture with the world markets coincided with a global agricultural 
recession pushing the Indian agricultural prices downward relative to other sectors in the 
economy. Domestic liberalization measures such as reducing subsidies, and cutting down 
formal (relatively cheaper) state-supported agricultural credit meant that farmers faced 
higher costs. A lot of farmers were pushed to borrowing from informal moneylenders at 
astronomical interest rates (ranging from 24% per annum to 60% per annum). This 
created a "double squeeze" of the Indian farmers (Vakulabharanam 2004). Alongside 
other factors mentioned above (and the social reproductive crisis discussed below), this 
has created a sense of insecurity about deriving a stable livelihood from agriculture. 
Although agricultural growth rates at the national level have picked up after 2006, several 
pockets of Indian agriculture have remained distress-prone. 
 
 This has created a massive impetus to migrate over the last two decades in India. 
In the mid-1990s, about 70% of the Indian population was still directly or indirectly 
dependent on agriculture while the fastest growing sectors in India were services and 
manufacturing, mainly in urban spaces. Not all migration from rural areas is distress-
induced. There is a class distinction in the way migration has progressed. On the one 
hand, the better-off farmers have tended to move their capital to urban areas or pursue the 
route of higher education in order to integrate into the higher echelons of the neoliberal 
class configuration (Damodaran 2008). On the other hand, the vast majority of farmers 
and agricultural workers (in those areas where the distress phenomenon has been 
rampant) have tended to integrate into the informal and precarious domains of the urban 
economy. However, as we describe in the next sub-section, the out-migration of the 
majority of the agricultural population has not been matched by growing organized 
employment in manufacturing (like it happened in the East Asian countries, including the 
recent experience of China). The impetus to migrate has been met with a deep 
employment crisis in the otherwise, fast-growing urban spaces. What this has meant is 
that migration remains transient, footloose and uncertain. The migrants have to choose 
from a portfolio of laboring options in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors to eke out 
a precarious livelihood. 
 
b. Employment Crisis 
 
 We briefly present the main contours of the employment crisis over the last three 
decades in this section. If we divide the economy into two parts, agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, the main narrative of employment can be laid out clearly. The first 
point is about the volume of employment. According to the Indian national sample survey 
employment and unemployment rounds, between 1983 and 2011-12, the overall labor 
force has risen from 305 million people to about 473 millions. Of this increase of about 
170 million jobs, only about 20 million new jobs have been created in agriculture, and 
about 150 millions in the non-agricultural sector. In 2011-12, agriculture contributed to 
about 225 million jobs and non-agricultural sector contributed the remaining 248 million 
jobs. However, if we look at the recent period (after 2004), there has been negative 
addition to the agricultural jobs (about -33 million), while non-agricultural employment 
has risen by about 50 million jobs.  In terms of employment growth during this entire 
period, the fastest growth was experienced in the period, 1983-2005, while growth rates 
have slowed considerably after this period (Thomas 2014). 
 
 If we further analyze the growth in non-agricultural employment, several 
interesting features can be found. First, the major increases in non-agricultural 
employment are in the construction industry (Thomas 2014). These jobs are temporary, 
precarious and informal in nature. These jobs also require low skill, so they are suitable 
for a transient, migrant workforce (Shrivastava 2012). Second, urban males have largely 
captured the higher quality employment (a relatively small proportion of employment). 
This is in sectors such as Information Technology, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
(Thomas 2014). Third, according to these official data, both in rural as well as urban 
areas, women constitute a small proportion of the total employment in non-agricultural 
sector (about a fifth of the total employment). 
 
 In terms of the nature of employment, self-employment and casual labor dominate 
predominantly in rural areas (about 70% of the total) in 2004-05. In urban areas, self-
employment and casual labor contribute about 60% of the total employment in 2004-05 
(Shrivastava 2012). The informal sector contributes to about 92% of the total 
employment in the Indian economy in 2011-12 (ILO 2016). 
 
 We can infer several important things from the above statistics. First, agricultural 
is an overall shrinking sector in terms of employment, so there is a clear re-ordering of 
productive labor away from agriculture. Second, since high quality and regular formal 
jobs (with contracts) are not forthcoming, labor has moved into informal occupations, 
i.e., informal enterprises, self-employment, and informal jobs in formal corporations. In 
other words, labor has become increasingly flexible, even as workers have performed 
increasingly precarious and transient work. Third, in conjunction with the agrarian crisis 
described above and from various micro-studies on Indian labor, this signifies the 
proliferation of insecure labor, i.e. workers now perform highly seasonal and fragmented 
labor. It is labor that is constantly on the move between urban and rural, between 
agriculture and non-agriculture, and for women, it is also a more complex combination of 
productive and reproductive labor in multiple locations in any extended period. This 
latter phenomenon is what we turn to in the next sub-section. 
 
c. Crisis of Social Reproduction 
 
 Social reproduction, or the production and maintenance of human life itself, 
requires not just the act of biological reproduction, but also the provisioning of basic 
needs (through the production of goods and services such as cooking, cleaning, fetching 
water), and care work (the care of children, the elderly, the sick etc.) (Razavi 2007). One 
important aspect of reproductive labor is that it serves as space-connecting and time-
connecting labor (Massey 2013). And while time and space compression may be a 
hallmark of many capitalist processes in India, migration being one possible example of 
such compression, there are several ways in which the spatial and temporal disconnect 
between productive and reproductive labor has grown quite significantly in both rural and 
urban India.  
 
First, the decline in agricultural employment, particularly agricultural wage 
employment for rural women, has meant a decline in work that is geographically closer to 
home (Narain and Nischal 2007).  Second, there has been a significant privatization of 
rural and urban common property resources, particularly in the post-liberalization era 
(Maringanti et al 2012, Gidwani and Baviskar 2011). This has meant an increase in the 
time needed to collect the basic raw materials of social reproduction. The lack of access 
to these raw materials could possibly serve as an additional “push” factor that leads to 
temporary migration. In Roy’s study of migrants in Kolkotta (Roy 2007), one woman 
interviewee reported commuting to the city to collect twigs and paper that she could use 
as firewood back in her village. In her village, she explained, she did not have access to 
even that much.  
 
Third, the increase in temporary, circular migration destabilizes any existing patterns 
of access to these raw materials. With every move, sources of water and fuel must be 
sourced anew, and, as has now been widely documented, these basic elements of social 
reproduction are extremely difficult to access in the slums and squatter settlements, and 
on the city pavements where the majority of urban migrants live (Truelove 2011, Coelho 
et al 2013). As an example, Mosse et al (2005) cite data that urban migrants resort to 
burning plastic and tires as fuel for cooking.  To the extent that urban migrants are also 
less likely to be part of social networks of other women who can share some of the 
burdens of care work, these contradictions only intensify further (Coelho et al 2013).  
 
These pressures can be resolved by abandoning paid work when it cannot be easily 
combined with reproductive labor (Banerjee and Raju 2009). In India’s urban slums, the 
hours required to collect water alone can reduce women’s ability to engage in full time 
paid work (Truelove 2011, Coelho et al 2013). The pressures of social reproduction can 
also result in the abandonment of certain forms of reproductive labor, particularly the 
care of children or the elderly. In both urban and rural India, the very young, the very old, 
and the sick, are left to fend for themselves during the work day, or, in the case of some 
migrant families, for much longer periods of time as the spatial disconnect between 
productive and reproductive labor becomes impossible to bridge (Mosse et al 2002, 
Pattenden 2012). 
 
 Last but certainly not least, these pressures can be partially accommodated by 
increases in the work day of women who bear this double burden.  There is a large 
literature that explores how increases in reproductive labor can help mitigate the effects 
of capitalist crises by acting as a “shock absorber” (Elson 2010).  This is the crux of our 
argument. The intensification of women’s work and of women’s responsibilities props up 
this system of precarious and fragmented livelihoods as increases in unpaid labor are 
used to fulfill basic needs and allow workers to survive what would otherwise be an 
unsustainable destruction of livelihoods (Naidu and Rao 2017).  As Roy (2007) vividly 
describes in the context of urban squatters in Calcutta, in conjunction with the 
employment crisis and rigid gender divisions of labor, this can lead to the phenomenon of 
underemployed men, living with, and off, overworked women. Thus capitalist crises get 
displaced into the sphere of social reproduction and on to the (malnourished) bodies of 
women and children. 
 
 This last dynamic is especially important since it does not appear that most 
migrants expect to solve their problems of lack of access to water, fuel or even lack of 
time for care work through migration. Other than in Roy’s work (2007), we found no 
references to expectations amongst unskilled workers that the raw materials of social 
reproduction would be easier to find in the city (it may be a different matter for skilled 
migrants with access to taps and electricity). One possible implication is a decrease in the 
likelihood that women will migrate at all. Garikipati (2008) argues that awareness of the 
sub-standard living conditions and lack of sanitation at migration destinations, along with 
the inflexibility of women’s care obligations toward children and the elderly, reduced 
their willingness and ability to migrate with their spouses, leading to majority male 
migrant streams in the villages she studied.  
  
On the other hand, as discussed earlier, family migration is a significant form of 
temporary migration in India, and we argue that the fraught conditions of social 
reproduction at both origin and destination of temporary migrants help us to understand 
why.  Mosse et al (2005) point out that family migration (including children) is more 
likely amongst poorer, unskilled distress migrants, and it is relatively skilled young men 
who can earn high wages who are able to “opportunistically” migrate alone.  Pattenden 
(2012) found that family migration dominated amongst unskilled workers.  Guérin et al 
(2007) found that family migration was more likely the greater the debt dependence of 
the migrants, and that family migration had increased amongst resurveyed migrants 
(Guérin et al 2015). For such migrants, the difficulty of securing the conditions of social 
reproduction even after migration makes the ‘subsidy’ provided by the unpaid 
reproductive labor of women critically important. 
 
IV. Migration as Social Transformation 
 
 As discussed above, according to the Indian census, in 2016 (based on projections 
from the last census in 2011), the Indian urban population was about 33% of the total 
population. This is, most likely, a gross underestimation of the urban population in India. 
Urbanization in India is progressing rapidly in India along two lines. The first one is 
along the axis of extended urbanization, wherein urban areas envelop and annex villages 
in their growth. Second, there is increased migration from rural to urban areas. As 
mentioned above, this is both the permanent migration as well as short-term migration. 
Both these axes are not carefully captured in the Indian census. Several villages that now 
have lost their rural character (like the dominance of agricultural occupation) around 
cities are still governed by village panchayats (village-level administrative bodies) and 
much of the short-term migration is not counted as urban. In the latter case, because the 
migrants have one foot in rural areas, and another in the urban, they do not get counted in 
the urban. However, in this urban-rural sense, the boundaries have become much more 
fluid than what a clearly demarcated rural-urban axis would illuminate. We name the 
increasing dominance of the urban in the national economy and society as the first 
structural transformation in India, i.e. rapid urbanization. 
 
 Migration crises (of the three overlapping kinds discussed above) have played a 
key role in determining the character of this first transformation. Some of the permanent 
migrants who have access to some land and wealth, have been able to use either capital or 
education to integrate into the upper echelons (professionals and skilled members) of the 
working class, while a vast majority either permanently or temporarily join the 
informal/precarious and low paying urban occupations. Spatially, many of these migrants 
are either housed in the inner-city slums or in the new squatter settlements that come up 
on the fringes of the Indian cities. Many villages that are integrating into urban areas also 
provide a temporary residential space for the migrants. Many of the migrants also engage 
in various occupations that are premised on self-employment given the employment crisis 
in the organized/formal sector. This produces city spaces that are highly unequal, and 
enclave-like (with the rich and the better off professionals) occupying certain preferred 
locations, while the low-skilled and temporary migrants live on the fringes or in densely 
populated slums. The logic of social reproduction (as described above) in cities plays a 
key role in the survival of these vast majorities of workers, who survive without decent 
work and housing. 
 
 The second major transformation that migration crises signify is the deeper 
penetration of Indian capitalism over the last 2-3 decades across the rural-urban divide. 
There have been two major processes at work in this second transformation. The first 
process involves the privatization of public properties (such as public sector units, and the 
capture of government lands for private use), privatization and erosion of commons, and 
the increased dispossession of the productive assets of petty commodity producers. These 
sub-processes heighten the agrarian and social reproductive crises. This, then, results in 
the strengthening of private capital but also in a releasing a lot of new labor into the 
precarious labor market that was not at the command of private capital in a direct way. 
The second process through which Indian capitalism has deepened is through the use of 
this newly available labor (on top of the previously available labor in urban spaces). We 
discuss below the ways in which this newly available labor is integrated into Indian 
capitalism. 
 
 One of the ways in which migrants are integrated into the labor market becomes 
clear by following the field studies of inter-state migrant communities. Inter-state 
migration is often associated with greater reliance on middlemen and debt dependence 
upon them. Mosse et al (2005) report that workers often do not know which employer 
they have worked for during the migratory stint, their relationship being entirely with the 
broker. While in some cases brokers merely facilitate migration, paying workers on a 
daily or weekly basis at the migration work site, in other cases brokers pay workers 
upfront, extending a loan that the worker pays off with his/her labor.  Guérin et al (2015) 
point out that the forms of debt bondage that result from the latter practice are now 
widespread, if temporary, arguing that this is one example of the way that capitalism may 
effectively harness so-called non-capitalist relations of dependence.  
 
 The NSS employment-unemployment surveys show a perceptible increase in the 
phenomenon of self-employment and casual labor in urban areas, and more broadly non-
agricultural work. A lot of this increase in self-employment is the result of the increased 
work in putting out systems that are characterized as sub-contracting processes 
(Shrivastava 2012). A significant part of the increase in self-employment is nothing but 
the outsourcing of work that happened in larger organizations to the poorer migrant 
households that do not, therefore, have to be covered by labor legislation or any welfare 
legislations. The increase in casual labor is a much more direct integration into the labor 
market of the migrants and the previously poor urban residents. This integration is into 
realm of precarious/informal work built on the imagined infinite elasticity of women and 
children as shock-absorbers in this fast-paced transformation of the Indian economy into 
a rapidly growing capitalist one with multiple labor arrangements that involve different 
degrees of freedom and servitude. 
 
 What is the nature of this capitalism? It is clearly not a story of workers achieving 
"double freedom" in the sense Marx meant it. Workers may be largely free of their means 
of production but they do not always enter the institution of free wage labor. For women 
workers we may actually see falling shares of both self-employment as well as wage 
labor as burdens of reproductive labor intensify. However, whatever the nature of the 
labor arrangement and the servitude associated with it, capital has found a way to access 
the newly available labor through sub-contracting processes or through complicated debt 
peonage structures. The distinction Banaji (2013) makes between two levels of analysis, 
i.e. forms of labor exploitation, and the larger social relations is apposite in this context. 
Purely analyzing the labor exploitation modes, one would conclude that free wage labor 
as an arrangement is not as widely prevalent. However, if we take out the teleological 
implications of the expression "formal subsumption of labor", Indian economy has 
become more deeply capitalist (of a neoliberal kind) through this episode of massive 
migration that will only continue in the coming decades. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The overall conclusion of this short paper is that Indian economy over the last 2-3 
decades has been witnessing two inter-related phenomena. On the one hand, a majority of 
rural residents have been hit by an unevenly spread out agrarian crisis, an employment 
crisis, and a social reproductive crisis that creates the impetus to migrate to urban spaces. 
On the other hand, the absence of decent forthcoming employment in urban areas means 
that the workers migrate into low paying informal and precarious occupations once for 
all, or they live in a permanent state of movement and mobility between the rural and 
urban areas. These phenomena basically facilitate the yanking of labor (both of the 
productive and reproductive kinds) from its rooted locations, creating labor-in-general or 
abstract labor (in Marx's terminology) that is increasingly more available to capital to 
appropriate cheaply, and more directly. This manifests as a rapidly growing Indian 
economy with growth rates of over 7% since 1990s. Many observers see this growth 
process as driven by the urban growth engine, which in our view is a re-ordering of 
productive and reproductive labor on a massive spatial scale. While crises contribute to 
this migration phenomenon, they represent, in our view, the other side of the deep 
transformation of the overall society. It is a transformation that has already instituted new 
forms of inequality and precarity of livelihoods for the vast majority, while affording new 
opportunities of wealth making for the chosen few - the owners, managers and a small 
privileged group of the working class, the professionals.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Permanent migrants as a share of the population 
  1983 1988 1999 2008 
All permanent migrants  23 25 26 28 
Economic migrants  3 3 3 3 
Marriage migrants 13 16 17 19 
%  of migrants who are women 74 76 78 81 
% of migrants to urban areas 32 29 32 33 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NSS survey data 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of working age urban permanent migrants by gender (in 
percentages) 
Women 1983 1988 1999 2008 
Marriage migrants 58 61 64 65 
Economic migrants 5 4 3 3 
Follower migrants 31 27 26 26 
Urban-urban migrants 40 40 41 41 
Men 1983 1988 1999 2008 
Marriage migrants 1 2 2 1 
Economic migrants 63 63 61 64 
Follower migrants 19 18 19 18 
Urban-urban migrants 40 40 39 38 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NSS survey data 
 
 
Table 3: Temporary Migration: NSS data (in millions) 
  1999 2008 
  Total Urban Total Urban 
Male 6.9 1.5 11.6 0.9 
Female 4 0.9 2 0.2 
Source: Vakulabharanam and Thakurata(2014) 
 
 
Table 4: Inter-state permanent migration to urban areas 
	  	   1983 1988 1999 2008 
As a share of urban economic 
migrants 32 31 31 41 
As a share of urban marriage 
migrants 16 15 14 15 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NSS survey data 
